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I. INTRODUCTION
Sea level rise in this century is a scientifically docu-
mented fact. Our shoreline is suffering from its effects to-
day. Moreover, a recent study conducted by the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA, 1983) predicts a possi-
ble one foot rise in sea level over the next thirty to forty
years and approximately three feet over the next hundred
years. It must be accepted that regardless of attempts to
forestall the process, the Atlantic Ocean, as a result of sea
level rise and periodic storms, is ultimately going to force
those who have built too near the beach front to retreat.
South Carolina Blue Ribbon Commission on Beachfront
Management (1987)1
§ 113A-107.1. Sea-level policy.
(a) The General Assembly does not intend to mandate the
development of sea-level policy or the definition of rates
of sea-level change for regulatory purposes.
* Richard E. Nelson Chair in Local Government Law, University of Florida Levin
College of Law. The author thanks Tom Ankersen and Thomas Ruppert for sharing infor-
mation and insights from their capacious knowledge base concerning the practical and legal
implications of sea-level rise, Donna Christie and her colleagues for hosting the 25th Anni-
versary Symposium of the Distinguished Lecture Series, Megan Herzog of the UCLA School
of Law for her insightful suggestions, and the exemplary students in my Advanced Taking
class for keeping their professor (me) on his toes and helping me hone many of the concepts
that I present here. I am also grateful for generous summer research support from the Lev-
in College of Law.
1. S.C. BLUE RIBBON COMM. ON BEACHFRONT MGMT. ii (1987), available at http://
www.scdhec.gov/environment/ocrm/docs/SCAC/Blue%20Ribbon%2OReportBeachfront%20
Management.pdf.
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(b) No rule, policy, or planning guideline that defines a rate
of sea-level change for regulatory purposes shall be adopted
except as provided by this section.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a
county, municipality, or other local government entity from
defining rates of sea-level change for regulatory purposes.
(e) The [North Carolina Coastal Resources] Commission
shall be the only State agency authorized to define rates of
sea-level change for regulatory purposes. If the Commission
defines rates of sea-level change for regulatory purposes, it
shall do so in conjunction with the Division of Coastal Man-
agement of the Department. The Commission and Division
may collaborate with other State agencies, boards, and
commissions; other public entities; and other institutions
when defining rates of sea-level change.
North Carolina General Statutes § 113A-107.1 (2012)2
Sea-level rise (SLR) resulting from climate change is a reality,
notwithstanding the protestations emanating from certain politi-
cians who would like to ban references to SLR altogether or to
fiddle with overwhelming scientific evidence and nearly univer-
sally approved methodology. 3 Rather than waiting for Rome to
burn, or rather to sink, it makes much more sense for policy- and
law-makers to join the ranks of experts in science, engineering,
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-107.1 (2012). See also Patrick Gannon, Sea-level Rise Bill
Becomes Law, STARNEWS, Aug. 1, 2012, at 1B:
Gov. Beverly Perdue on Wednesday declined to sign or veto a controversial
bill on sea-level rise, allowing it to become law.
Instead, the Democratic governor urged the Republican-dominated legisla-
ture to reconsider its stand on the issue.
"North Carolina should not ignore science when making public policy deci-
sions," Perdue said in a statement. "House Bill 819 will become law because it al-
lows local governments to use their own scientific studies to define rates of sea
level change. I urge the General Assembly to revisit this issue and develop an ap-
proach that gives state agencies the flexibility to take appropriate action in re-
sponse to sea-level change within the next four years."
An early version of the proposal would have prohibited the state from using
projections of accelerated sea rise-which many scientists believe is coming be-
cause of global warming and the melting of polar ice caps-when forming coastal
development policies and rules. Instead, under the earlier proposal, the state
could have determined sea-level rise rates using historical data alone, which
would have allowed the state only to plan for about 8 inches of rise this century.
3. See, e.g., Fred Grimm, Banned Words in Some States: Rising Sea Levels, THE MI-
AMI HERALD (June 11, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/06/11/2844468/banned-
words-in-some-states-rising.html; Leigh Phillips, Sea Versus Senators: North Carolina Sea-
Level Rise Accelerates While State Legislators Put the Brakes on Research, 486 NATURE 450
(2012).
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construction, real estate, law, and many other fields who are
seriously considering a range of strategies for adapting to the his-
toric, ongoing, and anticipated rise in sea levels.
While the costs of some of these adaptation strategies are
undeniably daunting, the American legal system poses an addi-
tional, potentially budget-busting impediment-the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Clause, which somewhat innocuously reads, "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation,"' 4 has
since the late twentieth century been interpreted by zealous
protectors of private property rights to reach not only the affirma-
tive power of eminent domain (or condemnation) but also, and
most problematically, statutes, ordinance, and other regulations
by federal, state, and local governments that arguably effect the
functional equivalence of an eminent domain taking. Moreover,
just over the decisional horizon looms a novel variation that
departs even farther from the language and original understand-
ing of the Fifth Amendment-judicial takings.
Officials at all governmental strata-federal, state, and local-
and from all three branches should keep the demands made by
the Takings Clause, as interpreted by the judiciary, in mind as
they choose tools from the diverse SLR-adaptation toolbox, as they
justify their choices to the electorate and other constituencies,
as they put those tools to use, and as they defend that use from
litigants claiming abuse. This article sets out to achieve four tasks,
and the remainder of the text is divided accordingly. First, the
article locates the heart of the Takings Clause in a single sen-
tence from a 1960 decision-Armstrong v. United States.5 Second,
the article reviews six taking varieties, ranging from the most
concrete common-the affirmative exercise of eminent domain-to
the most fanciful (at least to date)-judicial takings. Each variety
in turn is matched with one representative Supreme Court
decision and with operative language drawn from that opinion.
Third, with Armstrong as a guiding principle, the article identifies
which of the most common SLR tools already being deployed
pose "no, "minimal," "moderate," and "serious" takings implica-
tions. Fourth, the article suggests methods that government offi-
cials can use to address the takings risk posed by tools with the
highest takings risk.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
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II. ARMSTRONG AND THE HEART OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
The regrettable morass known as regulatory takings has
puzzled courts, litigators, and commentators for decades; contro-
versies still rage over the extent and even legitimacy of this meth-
od for invalidating statutes, ordinances, and other regulations
governing the use of land and other forms of private property.
Nevertheless, after a quarter century of intermittent Supreme
Court jurisprudence on the subject, dating from the decision in
Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, 6 it is
possible to locate the heart-the quintessence-of the dozen words
that bring the multifarious Fifth Amendment to a close.
The heart of Takings Clause jurisprudence does not reside in
the Holmesian conundrum of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,'
the seminal Supreme Court case in which the Yankee from Olym-
pus offered up this memorable, though eminently unhelpful, sen-
tence: "The general rule at least is that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking."8 At this late date we can only mourn
the forests of trees that have been sacrificed by the many writers
(too many, present company not excepted 9) who have done their
damndest to discern just what exactly the Swami of the Hub
meant by "too far."
To boil the dozen words down to their essence we should
turn instead to the pen of Justice Hugo Black in 1960's Armstrong
v. United States.10 Near the close of the Court's opinion holding
that the federal government's "total destruction" of the value of
material liens "has every possible element of a Fifth Amendment
'taking' and is not a mere 'consequential incidence' of a valid reg-
ulatory measure,"" Justice Black offered the following sentence,
which constitutes an apt lodestar for the judiciary to follow in
all takings cases: "The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private
property shall not be taken for a public use without just compen-
sation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole."' 2
6. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
7. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
8. Id. at 415.
9. See, e.g., Michael Allan Wolf, Pondering Palazzolo: Why Do We Continue to Ask the
Wrong Questions?, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10367 (2002).
10. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
11. Id. at 48.
12. Id. at 49. For more recent Court takings cases quoting this language, see Ark.
Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518 (2012); Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 336 (2002); Palazzolo v. R.I.,
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In this simple, but by no means simplistic manner, Justice
Black anticipated the notion of functional equivalence that the
Court employed most recently in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.13
Writing for a unanimous Court in that 2005 decision, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor explained that which the various tests
employed in key regulatory takings have in common: "Each aims
to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to
the classic taking in which government directly appropriates
private property or ousts the owner from his domain." 14 So, as we
proceed to the remaining sections of this article, we should keep
in mind two critical ideas: (1) that government, as Justice Black
so eloquently explained, has an obligation to act justly and fairly
by not imposing public burdens on one or a few private owners;
and (2) that the Takings Clause (and the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses, too, for that matter) are protections against
the privations to property owners caused by government actors,
not by the forces of nature. The italics in the previous sentence
are intentional, for it is crucial to remember that the public coffers
should be subject to a takings claim only when the burden car-
ried by the private property owner is public in nature and the
harm suffered by the private property owner was caused by the
state (intentionally or otherwise).
533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 9
(1988); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of L.A., 482 U.S.
304, 318-19 (1987); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163 (1980);
and Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 123. See also William Michael Treanor, The Arm-
strong Principle, The Narratives of Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1151 (1997). The Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act includes
the following as one of the meanings of the terms "inordinate burden" and "inordinately
burdened" found in the statute: "that the property owner is left with existing or vested uses
that are unreasonable such that the property owner bears permanently a disproportionate
share of a burden imposed for the good of the public, which in fairness should be borne by
the public at large." FLA. STAT. ANN § 70.001(3)(e)(1) (West 2012).
13. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
14. Id. at 539. The fact that Justice Antonin Scalia participated in the Lingle majority
does not necessarily mean that he endorsed the notion of functional equivalence. See, e.g.,
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (citations omitted):
Prior to Justice Holmes's exposition in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, it was
generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a "direct appropriation" of
property, or the functional equivalent of a "practical ouster of [the owner's] posses-
sion," Justice Holmes recognized in Mahon, however, that if the protection against
physical appropriations of private property was to be meaningfully enforced, the
government's power to redefine the range of interests included in the ownership of
property was necessarily constrained by constitutional limits. If, instead, the uses
of private property were subject to unbridled, uncompensated qualification under
the police power, "the natural tendency of human nature [would be] to extend the
qualification more and more until at last private property disappear[ed]." These
considerations gave birth in that case to the oft-cited maxim that, "while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking."
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III. TAKING: ONE WORD, SIX VARIETIES
Justice O'Connor, in her opinion for a unanimous Supreme
Court in Lingle, did a commendable job of reviewing the justices'
tangled takings web. The context for the Court's exploration of
the takings taxonomy was the application by lower federal courts
of the " 'substantially advances' formula [from Agins v. City of
Tiburon15] to strike down a Hawaii statute that limits the rent
that oil companies may charge to dealers who lease service sta-
tions owned by the companies."16 The high court reversed, conclud-
ing "that the 'substantially advances' formula announced in Agins
is not a valid method of identifying regulatory takings for which
the Fifth Amendment requires just compensation." 17 Because the
formula had appeared in several takings cases decided by the
Court since its first appearance in 1980, Justice O'Connor and her
colleagues took the opportunity to examine the Court's takings
jurisprudence and to explain how dropping the "substantially
advances" dictum would have no real impact on existing law. Table
1 presents a taxonomy of takings cases that, with the exception of
the final category, roughly tracks with the Lingle opinion's review,
identifying operative language from a representative case that
illustrates how each "variety" of taking differs from the others.
TABLE 1
WHAT EXACTLY IS A FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKING?
TYPE OF TAKING REPRESENTATIVE OPERATIVE
DECISION LANGUAGE
Affirmative exercise Kelo v. City of New "[I]t is equally clear
of the sovereign London18  that a State may trans-
power of eminent fer property from one
domain (ED) private party to anoth-
er if future 'use by the
public' is the purpose
of the taking."1 9
15. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (holding that "[t]he application of a general zoning law to
particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legiti-
mate state interests...").
16. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 532.
17. Id. at 545.
18. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
19. Id. at 477.
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Government- Loretto v. Teleprompt- "We conclude that a
required, perma- er Manhattan CATV permanent physical
nent, physical occu- Corp.20  occupation authorized
pation (PO) by government is a
taking without regard
to the public interests
that it may serve." 21
Total deprivation of Lucas v. S.C. Coastal "[W]hen the owner of
use and/or value Council22  real property has been
(TD) called upon to sacrifice
all economically bene-
ficial uses in the name
of the common good,
that is, to leave his
property economically
idle, he has suffered a
taking."23
Partial taking that
falls short of a total
deprivation (PT)
Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. City of New
York 24
"The economic impact
of the regulation on the
claimant and, particu-
larly, the extent to
which the regulation
has interfered with
distinct investment-
backed expectations
are, of course, relevant
considerations. So, too,
is the character of the
governmental action. A
'taking' may more
readily be found when
the interference with
property can be char-
acterized as a physical
invasion by govern-
ment, than when inter-
ference arises from
some public program
adjusting the benefits
and burdens of eco-
nomic life to promote
the common good." 25
20. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
21. Id. at 426.
22. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
23. Id. at 1019.
24. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
25. Id. at 124 (citations omitted).
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Exaction of a proper-
ty interest even if
the value of the sub-
ject property would
be enhanced by
grant of the condi-
tional permit (EX)
Dolan v. City of
Tigard26
"Under the well-settled
doctrine of 'unconstitu-
tional conditions,' the
government may not
require a person to
give up a constitutional
right-here the right to
receive just compensa-
tion when property is
taken for a public
use-in exchange for a
discretionary benefit
conferred by the gov-
ernment where the
benefit sought has lit-
tle or no relationship to
the DrODertv." 27
Judicial taking (JT) Stop the Beach Re- "If a legislature or a
nourishment, Inc. v. court declares that
Fla. Dep't of Envtl. what was once an es-
Prot.28  tablished right of pri-
vate property no longer
exists, it has taken
that property, no less
than if the State had
physically appropriat-
ed it or destroyed its
value by regulation."29
The first takings category-the affirmative exercise of the
sovereign power of eminent domain (delineated in this article by
the abbreviation ED)-while very straightforward, is not without
controversy, as illustrated by the uber controversy that followed
the Court's announcement of its 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of
New London30 over the meaning of "public use."31 In the last sever-
al years, state legislatures and voters have narrowed the defini-
tion of public use and provided additional procedural protections
for landowners whose property is targeted for eminent domain.32
26. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
27. Id. at 385.
28. 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (plurality opinion) [hereinafter STBR].
29. Id. at 2602.
30. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
31. See, e.g., Michael Allan Wolf, Hysteria Versus History: Public Use in the Public
Eye, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 15 (Robin
Paul Malloy ed., 2008).
32. See, e.g., POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79F.03[3] [b] [iv] (Michael Allan Wolf ed.
2013) [hereinafter POWELL] (detailing state legislative and constitutional changes in re-
sponse to Kelo).
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Nevertheless, local, state, and federal officials continue to possess
broad powers to take title to a wide variety of private property
interests, as long as just compensation-typically equated with
fair market value-is rendered.
The second taking type-a permanent physical occupation
required by the government (PO)-is the first of what Justice
O'Connor called the "two categories of regulatory action that gen-
erally will be deemed per se takings for Fifth Amendment pur-
poses."33 The representative decision, Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.,34 involved the owner of an apartment
building who objected to a state law requiring her to permit the
company to install cable television equipment on her property,
and the Lingle Court acknowledged that this and the second per se
category were "relatively narrow" in scope. 35
The third type of taking (and second per se variety) involves
government regulations that, in the words of Justice Scalia in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,36 deprive the owner of
"all economically beneficial uses" of his or her property. 37 Coinci-
dentally, and not without importance to our current concerns,
the state legislation that resulted in the landowner losing all value
in his coastal parcels-the South Carolina Beachfront Manage-
ment Act-grew out of the efforts of the Blue Ribbon Committee
on Beachfront Management whose report contained the first epi-
graph to this article (concerning the reality of SLR), language
that today would attract the negative attention of skeptical politi-
cians and ideologues. 38
The term per se is a bit misleading, as even a total deprivation
(TD) would be legal if the government restriction responsible for
the deprivation
inhere[s] in the title itself, in the restrictions that back-
ground principles of the State's law of property and nui-
sance already place upon land ownership. A law or decree
with such an effect must, in other words, do no more than
duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the
courts-by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected
persons) under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the
33. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005).
34. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
35. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538. For failed efforts to expand the reach of Loretto, see Yee v.
City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 539 (1992) (holding that "[because the Escondido rent con-
trol ordinance does not compel a landowner to suffer the physical occupation of his property,
it does not effect a per se taking under Loretto").
36. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
37 Id. at 1019.
38. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also sources cited supra note 4.
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State under its complementary power to abate nuisances
that affect the public generally, or otherwise.39
While, as we will see, the prevention of private and public nui-
sances is very compatible with the goals of several SLR adaptation
strategies, the most intriguing possibility for making such strat-
egies takings-proof lies in the example that Justice Scalia provides
as an illustration of the last word in the paragraph quoted above:
The principal "otherwise" that we have in mind is litigation
absolving the State (or private parties) of liability for the
destruction of "real and personal property, in cases of actual
necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire" or to forestall
other grave threats to the lives and property of others. 40
The first case cited for this proposition by the Lucas majority-
Bowditch v. Boston 4 1-involved the demolition of a building to
stop the spread of a fire and thus involved the Court's considera-
tion of the so-called "conflagration rule." As Professors David Dana
and Thomas Merrill have explained, one possible explanation for
this rule "is based on causation. If the claimant's property would
have been engulfed by fire in any event, then the government's
intervention should not be regarded as the cause of its demise."42
Or, as Professor Ernst Freund conceded more than a century ago
in his classic exploration of the police power, "Of course there
can be no constitutional or moral duty of compensation, where
the property destroyed could not have been saved in any event."43
This is yet another example of the Armstrong principle in opera-
tion, as the burden was placed on the landowner most immediately
by the flames and only secondarily by public officials. Similarly,
39. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
40. Id. at 1029 n.16 (citing Bowditch v. Boston 101 U.S. 16, 18-19 (1880).
41. 101 U.S. 16.
42. DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 119 (2002). In the
sentence following Justice Holmes's articulation of his perplexing "general rule," he noted:
"It may be doubted how far exceptional cases, like the blowing up of a house to stop a con-
flagration, go--and if they go beyond the general rule, whether they do not stand as much
upon tradition as upon principle." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16
(1922) (citing Bowditch, 101 U.S. 16).
43. ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
§ 535, at 565 (1904). See also Robin Kundis Craig, Public Trust and Public Necessity Defens-
es to Takings Liability for Sea Level Rise Responses on the Gulf Coast, 26 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 395 (2011); Michael Kamprath, Addressing the Shaky Legal Foundations of Flori-
da's Fight Against Citrus Canker, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 453, 465-77 (2005); Dale A.
Whitman, Deconstructing Lingle: Implications for Takings Doctrine, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
573, 588-90 (2007); Derek T. Muller, "As Much Upon Tradition as Upon Principle": A Cri-
tique of the Privilege of Necessity Destruction Under the Fifth Amendment, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 481 (2006).
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those landowners who lose their land and their structures to rising
seas should not be able to recover compensation for a taking
occasioned primarily by the forces of nature and not by public offi-
cials who craft programs designed to prevent more widespread
harm. After all, houses, condominium, and apartment buildings,
as well as offices and businesses that lie on ecologically fragile bar-
rier islands, can be envisioned as mere flotsam waiting to happen,
not to mention the originating point for harmful fecal coliforms
and other pollutants.
The fourth type of taking is a deprivation occasioned by the
government that falls short of the total loss envisioned in Lucas.
The first version of the multi-factor test that the Court applies
to so-called "partial takings" (PT) appeared in 1978's Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 44 an unsuccessful chal-
lenge to the city's landmark preservation ordinance. The "economic
impact" of the challenged regulation is one of "several factors"
that "the Court's decisions have identified" as having "particular
significance" in the justices' attempts to "determin[e] when 'justice
and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action
be compensated by the government, rather than remain dispro-
portionately concentrated on a few persons."45 Analogizing the
preservation ordinance to other regulatory schemes such as zon-
ing, the Penn Central majority observed that, "in instances in
which a state tribunal reasonably concluded that 'the health, safe-
ty, morals, or general welfare' would be promoted by prohibiting
particular contemplated uses of land, this Court has upheld land-
use regulations that destroyed or adversely affected recognized
real property interests."46
The Penn Central test has become the default in regulatory
takings challenges that do not fit comfortably into the other
categories, and, while it is not impossible to find a case in which
property owners have prevailed, 47 government counsel and their
clients typically have reason to celebrate when a court opts for ad
hoc balancing over the other takings alternatives. 48 There are two
44. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
45. Id. at 124.
46. Id. at 125.
47. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687,
694 (1999):
After protracted litigation, the case was submitted to the jury on Del Monte
Dunes' theory that the city effected a regulatory taking or otherwise injured the
property by unlawful acts, without paying compensation or providing an adequate
postdeprivation remedy for the loss. The jury found for Del Monte Dunes, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed.
48. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc, v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 342 (2002) ("We conclude, therefore, that the interest in 'fairness and justice' will
be best served by relying on the familiar Penn Central approach when deciding cases like
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important reasons why Penn Central provides minimal solace
for property owners who feel overburdened by government regula-
tion, coastal and otherwise. First, the Court pointed out that the
government's chances for victory were enhanced "when interfer-
ence arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good." 49 Second,
the Court identified "the extent to which the regulation has inter-
fered with distinct investment-backed expectations" as a "relevant
consideration, ''" 50 seriously hindering cases brought by landown-
ers who acquired their property with knowledge of preexisting
government regulations or even of reasonably foreseeable exten-
sions of existing law. As the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit explained in a 2001 decision: "The reasonable
expectations test does not require that the law existing at the time
... would impose liability, or that liability would be imposed only
with minor changes in then-existing law. The critical question
is whether extension of existing law could be foreseen as reasona-
bly possible."51 Once government regimes have begun the process
of sharply curtailing development in coastal regions, all existing
and potential landowners should be on notice that further refine-
ments are quite likely in the offing.
The fifth taking category involves government exactions (EX)
of property interests in exchange for the grant of development
permission to the landowner. Most private landowners are happy
to offer this quid pro quo voluntarily, knowing that the enhanced
value of their real property will more than make up for the value
of the fee or easement granted to the public. Indeed, it seems silly
even to refer to this exercise as a "taking," at least when consid-
ering the financial aspects of the entire transaction. However, the
justices comprising the majorities in the Court's first two exaction
this, rather than by attempting to craft a new categorical rule."); Palazzolo v. R.I., 533 U.S.
606, 632 (2001) ("The court did not err in finding that petitioner failed to establish a depri-
vation of all economic value, for it is undisputed that the parcel retains significant worth for
construction of a residence. The claims under the Penn Central analysis were not examined,
and for this purpose the case should be remanded."). See also Palazzolo v. R.I., 2005 WL
1645974, at *15 (July 5, 2005) (footnote omitted) ("In sum, Plaintiff has failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that there has been a regulatory taking of his property.
Moreover, because the development proposed by Plaintiff would constitute a public nui-
sance, his title did not include a property right to develop the parcel as he proposed.").
49. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
50. Id.
51. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1327, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
See also Thomas Ruppert, Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations: Should Notice of
Rising Seas Lead to Falling Expectations for Coastal Property Purchasers?, 26 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 239, 275 (2011) ("While no one part of the Penn Central analysis necessarily
trumps, ensuring that coastal property owners have full understanding of the nature of the
hazards, the dynamic coastal environment, and existing and potential regulatory limita-
tions should demonstrate that owners' expectations which are drastically out of line with
these realities and information are not reasonable.").
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cases-Nollan v. California Coastal Commission52 and Dolan v.
City of Tigard53-- focused their attention solely on what the land-
owner lost, not on what he or she gained from the entire develop-
ment permission process.
The majority opinions in Nollan and Dolan contributed a
two-step inquiry to the already terribly confusing takings canon.
First, Justice Scalia in Nollan explained that when government
regulators opt for conditional approval rather than outright denial
of development permission, an "essential nexus" would be missing
"if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to fur-
ther the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition. '" 54
Second, Chief Justice William Rehnquist in Dolan clarified that
if the essential nexus between "the 'legitimate state interest' and
the permit condition exacted"55 by government is present, the gov-
ernment would prevail only if "the degree of the exactions de-
manded by the city's permit conditions bears the required rela-
tionship to the projected impact of petitioner's proposed develop-
ment."56 The Dolan Court labeled that relationship "rough propor-
tionality," noting that, while "[n]o precise mathematical calcu-
lation is required,"" government officials "must make some sort
of individualized determination that the required dedication is re-
lated both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development. '"5 7
There are three possible explanations for the Court's character-
ization of an exaction as a taking. The first is that a poorly crafted
exaction-one that asks a landowner to concede a property inter-
est totally unrelated to the protection of the public interest or
grossly out of proportion to any negative impact of the proposed
development-would appear to violate the following takings test
from a 1980 Supreme Court decision, Agins v. City of Tiburon58 :
"The application of a general zoning law to particular property
effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests."59 That was a possible rationale, at least
until the unanimous Court decided a quarter-century later in
Lingle "that the 'substantially advances' formula announced in
52. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
53. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
54. 483 U.S. at 837.
55. 512 U.S. at 386.
56. Id. at 388.
57. Id. at 391.
58. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
59. Id. at 260. The key language from Agins makes an appearance in both Nollan, 483
U.S. at 834 n.3 (1987), and Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (1994).
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Agins is not a valid method of identifying regulatory takings for
which the Fifth Amendment requires just compensation."60
A second possible explanation for equating exactions of real
property interests with takings is that what the government often
obtains is a right for the public to use the easement or fee simple
interest acquired from the private landowner. In her Lingle opin-
ion, Justice O'Connor explained that "[a]lthough Nollan and Dolan
quoted Agins' language, the rule those decisions established is
entirely distinct from the 'substantially advances' test we address
today,"6' 1 noting instead that the two earlier cases "involved ded-
ications of property so onerous that, outside the exactions con-
text, they would be deemed per se physical takings."6 2 However,
because those property dedications did occur in the exactions con-
text, they lacked the element of government compulsion that
characterizes unconstitutional, Loretto-like, physical occupation
takings.
The third and, to the high court in Lingle, ultimately satis-
factory explanation lies in what is known as the "unconstitu-
tional conditions" doctrine. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist
in Dolan, this controversial doctrine6 3 provides that "the govern-
ment may not require a person to give up a constitutional right-
here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken
for a public use-in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred
by the government where the benefit sought has little or no rela-
60. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005).
61. Id. at 547 (citations omitted).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 543 (1991) ("Indeed, the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine, in the form of the Nollan nexus test or the similar forms
of heightened judicial scrutiny that Professors Epstein, Sullivan, and others propose, is
quite costly."); Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Condi-
tions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2001) ('The persistent challenge, consequently,
has been to articulate some coherent or at least intelligible principles or tests by which to
determine which offers fall into which category-to explicate, in other words, a theory to
support the doctrine. Regrettably, more than a century of judicial and scholarly attention to
the problem has produced few settled understandings."); Richard A. Epstein, Foreword:
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4,
11 (1988) (footnote omitted) ("The importance of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
has brought forth an extensive array of academic literature to explain and justify it. The
received writing sensibly recognizes the essential place that the doctrine occupies in modern
constitutional law, but it makes far less sense when it attempts to explain how the doctrine
arises or what it does."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1413, 1415-16 (1989) ("[R]ecent Supreme Court decisions on challenges to unconstitu-
tional conditions seem a minefield to be traversed gingerly. Just when the doctrine appears
secure, new decisions arise to explode it."); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and
Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 594 (1990) ('The various puzzles produced by the doctrine
have created considerable doctrinal confusion and provoked a wide range of commentary.").
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tionship to the property. ' 64 In such cases, Justice O'Connor ex-
plained in Lingle, "the issue was whether the exactions substan-
tially advanced the same interests that land-use authorities as-
serted would allow them to deny the permit altogether. '65 Techni-
cally, the exaction itself does not really effect a taking, as a case
such as Dolan in reality involves an action that in other con-
texts would be an uncompensated taking that is "wrapped inside"
an illegal condition.
The sixth variety-judicial takings (JT)-is at this point one
vote shy of realizing Justice William Brennan's "rule of five."66
That is, only four current justices have gone on record in support
of the notion that members of the judiciary, like their counterparts
in the legislative and executive branches, can effect a taking of
private property without compensation. In a 2010 decision inextri-
cably tied to the realities of climate change in the coastal zone-
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection67-four justices (Justice Scalia writing, joined
by Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas and Chief Justice
John Roberts) held out the possibility that judges on a state high
64. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385.
65. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547. Justice O'Connor then seeks to distinguish this kind of
substantial advancement from the first prong of Agins that the Court has just deemed to be
a due process test:
That is worlds apart from a rule that says a regulation affecting property consti-
tutes a taking on its face solely because it does not substantially advance a legiti-
mate government interest. In short, Nollan and Dolan cannot be characterized as
applying the "substantially advances" test we address today, and our decision
should not be read to disturb these precedents.
Id. at 547-48. In this way, Nollan and Dolan maintained their jurisprudential vigor, as
demonstrated by the Court's decision to hear an exactions takings challenge during the
October 2012 Term. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 11-1447 (June 25,
2013). In Koontz, a five-member majority reiterated Justice O'Connor's point in Lingle:
So long as the building permit is more valuable than any just compensation the
owner could hope to receive for the right-of-way, the owner is likely to accede to
the government's demand, no matter how unreasonable. Extortionate demands of
this sort frustrate the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation, and the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine prohibits them.
Id. at 7.
66. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Themes in Warren Court Biographies, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
748, 763 (1995):
[Brennan's] law clerks report an annual event: At some point early in their
clerkships, Brennan asked his clerks to name the most important rule in constitu-
tional law. Typically they fumbled, offering Marbury v. Madison or Brown v.
Board of Education as their answers. Brennan would reject each answer, in the
end providing his own by holding up his hand with the fingers wide apart. This, he
would say, is the most important rule in constitutional law. Some clerks under-
stood Brennan to mean that it takes five votes to do anything, others that with
five votes you could do anything. In either version, though, Brennan's "rule of
five"-or, as the narrative of activism and restraint would have it, rule by five-
was about the meaning of five votes on the Court. It was not a substantive rule of
constitutional law.
67. 130 S.Ct. 2592 (2010).
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court could take property simply by "declar[ing] that what was
once an established right of private property no longer exists, ...
no less than if the State had physically appropriated it or
destroyed its value by regulation."68 While the four remaining
justices participating in the case expressed their doubts,69 some
Court observers have been intrigued by this embryonic takings
theory, a theory that, if it reaches maturity, could well have a
chilling effect on the adaptation of ancient common-law con-
cepts such as accretion, reliction, and avulsion70 to twenty-first
century climatic and hydrologic realities.
IV. THE RICH AND DIVERSE ADAPTATION TOOLKIT
Having set the jurisprudential table, it is now time to review
some of the major strategies that government at all strata are
and will be taking to adapt to dramatic and potentially devastating
sea level rise. Several helpful compendia of SLR adaptation tools
are available in hard copy and on the Internet, obviating the need
to reinvent the wheel in this increasingly important field. 71 Table 2
includes more than twenty such tools, and Tables 2A through 2D
groups these tools together by the degree of risk that takings law,
as applied by judges who have a competent understanding of the
current state of this evolving jurisprudence, 72 poses to their use.
68. Id. at 2602 (plurality).
69. See id. at 2617 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
('These difficult issues are some of the reasons why the Court should not reach beyond the
necessities of the case to recognize a judicial takings doctrine."); id. at 2618 (Breyer, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("I agree that no unconstitutional taking of
property occurred in this case, and I therefore join Parts I, IV, and V of today's opinion. I
cannot join Parts II and III, however, for in those Parts the plurality unnecessarily address-
es questions of constitutional law that are better left for another day.").
70. See id. at 2598; POWELL, supra note 32, at § 66.01.
71. See, e.g., JESSICA GRANNIS, GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CTR., ADAPTATION TOOL KIT:
SEA-LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL LAND USE: HOW GOVERNMENTS CAN USE LAND-USE PRAC-
TICES TO ADAPT TO SEA-LEVEL RISE (2011) [hereinafter ADAPTATION TOOL KIT], available at
http://www.georgetownclimate.org/sites/default/files/Adaptation-Tool Kit-SLR.pdf; BARBA-
RA J. LAUSCHE, MOTE MARINE LAB., TECH. REPORT NO. 1419, SYNOPSIS OF AN ASSESSMENT:
POLICY TOOLS FOR LOCAL ADAPTATION TO SEA LEVEL RISE (2009) [hereinafter MOTE],
available at http://www.mote.org/clientuploads[MPI/Synopsis-Policy%2Tools%20for%20Lo
cal%20Adaptation%20to%2OSea%2OLevel%2ORise(fin).pdf; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
ADAPTING TO THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2010) (especially ch. 3 "What Are Ameri-
ca's Options for Adaptation?"), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.phprecordid=1278
3#toc. There are resources on specific tools as well. See, e.g., JAMES G. TITUS, CLIMATE
READY ESTUARIES EPA, ROLLING EASEMENTS (2011), available at http://water.epa.gov/
type/oceb/cre/uploadlrollingeasementsprimer.pdf.
72. The Supreme Court heard two takings cases during the October 2012 Term. See
Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 515 (2012) ("[Rlecurrent flood-
ings, even if of finite duration, are not categorically exempt from Takings Clause liability.");
St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, No. 11-1447, slip op. at 22 (June 25, 2013)
("We hold that the government's demand for property from a land-use permit applicant
must satisfy the requirements of Nollan and Dolan even when the government denies the
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The risks run from nonexistent and minimal (Tables 2A and 2B) to
moderate (Table 2C), and up to serious (Table 2D).
TABLE 2
SLR ADAPTATION TOOLS
A REPRESENTATIVE LIST
* Notice to landowners of impending SLR
* Comprehensive plan SLR element
* Building code changes to accommodate SLR
" Government purchase of fee in properties vulnerable to SLR
* Government purchase of (or truly voluntary donation of) conserva-
tion easements on properties vulnerable to SLR
* SLR overlay zoning and downzoning (affecting height, area, and
use of undeveloped or underdeveloped parcels)
" Restrictions on existing, nonconforming buildings/uses in SLR over-
lay zone
* Enhanced floodplain restrictions in SLR areas
* Permits for soft-armoring in SLR areas (e.g., beach nourishment)
* Requiring living shorelines in place of hard-armoring structures
* Transferable development rights exchange with owners in SLR
zone
* Special assessments for beach nourishment and other soft-
armoring in SLR zones
* Increased buffers and setbacks for landowners directly affected by
SLR
* Prohibition of hard-engineered structures (armoring) in designated
SLR zones
* Massive public land acquisition in SLR areas and areas nearby
financed by new taxes and bond issues followed by resale with
restrictions to private owners
* Land banking in upland areas for future private use
* Exaction of coastal impact fees on all permitted development in the
SLR
* Development exactions of conservation easements or of fee title
interests, and imposition of coastal impact fees on all permitted
development in the SLR
* Prohibition of new, permanent structures in designated SLR zones,
declaring them to be public nuisances
* Ban on hard- and soft-armoring financed by owners of developed
parcels
* New judicial decisions that impose rolling easement ambulatory
boundaries and expand public property interests in the coastal zone
permit and even when its demand is for money."). The tables in this article identify the tak-
ings claims that plaintiffs are most likely to make in litigation. Of course, litigants on all
sides and the courts may choose to resolve these issues outside the takings context.
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Identifying the takings risk of SLR adaptation strategies
serves two distinct but related purposes. First, government offi-
cials can use this information to anticipate when serious legal
challenges may be mounted in anticipation, or in response to
the implementation, of specific tools. Armed with this informa-
tion, these officials can then seek legal counsel regarding the best
ways of mitigating the takings risks, such as modulating the
intensity of a regulation or mitigating the impact of a regulation
on specific private property owners who carry the heaviest burden.
Second, by measuring SLR adaption tools by their takings
risks, we can keep in the forefront of our policymaking the heart
and spirit of the takings clause as embodied in the Armstrong
principle: avoiding those regulations and other governmental activ-
ities that place a special burden on the few that, in the name
of justice and fairness, should be borne by the many. In other
words, adhering to the demands of takings jurisprudence should
not be an exercise in legal brinkmanship, but rather an attempt
to achieve an effective, forward-looking strategy without causing
needless harm.
TABLE 2A
SLR ADAPTATION TOOLS
LEVEL 1, NO TAKINGS RISK
* Notice to landowners of impending SLR
* Comprehensive plan SLR element
" Building code changes to accommodate SLR
" Government purchase of fee in properties vulnerable to SLR
* Government purchase of (or truly voluntary donation of) conserva-
tion easements on properties vulnerable to SLR
The tools that pose no takings risks (Table 2A) are those
that have no current financial impact on current owners (such as
informing coastal owners of impending SLR,73 modifying compre-
hensive plan elements to reflect SLR concerns, 74 and using public
funds to purchase conservation easements75 and fee title) or
that involve the exercise of the state's traditional police power
73. See Ruppert, supra note 51, at 262-66 (discussing a few state disclosure require-
ments referring specifically to coastal property).
74. See, e.g.. ADAPTATION TOOL KIT, supra note 71, at 16-18; MOTE, supra note 71, at
8-9.
75. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea-Level Rise, Property Rights,
and Time, 73 LA. L. REV. 69, 83 (2012); John D. Echeverria, Regulating Versus Paying Land
Owners to Protect the Environment, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 1 (2005); John R.
Nolon, Regulatory Takings and Property Rights Confront Sea Level Rise: How Do They
Roll?, 21 WIDENER L.J. 735 ,764-66 (2012); Jessica Owley, Conservation Easements at the
Climate Change Crossroads, 74 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199 (2011).
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(such as modifications of building codes 76). Unfortunately, but
not surprisingly, the most effective of these tools-public acquisi-
tion of title to private lands on barrier islands and in other highly
vulnerable locations-is cost-prohibitive given current and antici-
pated budget restraints at all levels of government. 77 Because
of this hard economic reality, governments have resorted to alter-
native regulatory tools in hopes of accomplishing the same goals,
much the same way that some early experimentation with emi-
nent domain to impose land use restrictions gave way to the nearly
ubiquitous reality of zoning without compensation. 78
TABLE 2B
SLR ADAPTATION TOOLS
LEVEL 2, MINIMAL TAKINGS RISK
" SLR overlay zoning and traditional downzoning (affecting height,
area, and use of undeveloped or underdeveloped parcels) (PT)
" Restrictions on existing, nonconforming buildings/uses in SLR over-
lay zone (PT)
* Enhanced floodplain restrictions in SLR areas (PT)
* Permits for soft-armoring in SLR areas (e.g., beach nourishment)
(PT)
* Requiring living shorelines in place of hard-armoring structures
(PT, EX)
* Transferable development rights exchange with owners in SLR
zone (ED)
KEY:
ED=Eminent Domain (Kelo), PT=Partial Taking (Penn Central),
EX=Exaction (Dolan)
76. See, e.g., Sean Reilly, Finding Silver Linings, 68 LA. L. REV. 331, 334 (2008) (foot-
note omitted) ('The LRA [Louisiana Recovery Authority] was active in the first Special Ses-
sion of the Legislature called by Governor Blanco in the fall of 2005. One early victory was
the enactment of the first uniform statewide residential building code in our state's history.
Modeled after the code enacted by Florida after its series of hurricanes, this code will serve
the state well when future disasters visit Louisiana's shores and its structures survive.");
Thomas Kaplan, Experts Advise Cuomo on Disaster Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2013, at
18 ("Two panels of experts charged with studying how New York can better prepare for dis-
asters like Hurricane Sandy said Thursday that the state should create a strategic fuel re-
serve, require some gas stations to install generators and update its building codes.").
77. Patricia E. Salkin & Charles Gottlieb, Engaging Deliberative Democracy at the
Grassroots: Prioritizing the Effects of the Fiscal Crisis in New York at the Local Government
Level, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 727, 728-29 (2012) ("Local governments are facing unprece-
dented fiscal challenges across the country. These challenges have forced many municipali-
ties to examine insolvency and have subjected others to state-initiated fiscal control boards.
In March 2011, The New York Times reported that states across the nation were planning
severe budget cuts in aid to cities and other local governments. These cuts were expected to
lead to more lay-offs, cuts in services, and increases in local taxes").
78. See CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND USE PLANNING AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: A CASEBOOK 262-64 (2012) [hereinafter LAND USE PLANNING] (discussing
"early attempts to zone entirely by eminent domain").
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As Table 2B indicates, several regulatory tools involve only
minimal takings risks, largely because of a long, relatively uncon-
troversial record of the use of these same or highly analogous
strategies for the past several decades. The use of overlay zoning 79
to impose greater restrictions on environmentally sensitive proper-
ties (floodplains, wetlands, critical habitat for protected species,
and the like) has become routine in American cities and counties,
and the Takings Clause has not posed a significant barrier for
governments who pursue this strategy. Neither does the typical
downzoning of a group of undeveloped parcels-that is, the imposi-
tion of more intense use (and perhaps height and area) restrictions
by changing the zoning classification-warrant serious considera-
tion by courts in which landowners cry "taking."80 Ever since the
United States Supreme Court established in its 1926 decision in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 81 "that there is no funda-
mental constitutional right to the speculative value of a piece of
property,"8 2 landowners seeking to maximize their investment
in real estate have for the most part been frustrated in their
attempts to use the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Takings
Clauses to reverse zoning and other comprehensive, expert-based,
state and local land use restrictions.8 3
Landowners challenging new restrictions imposed on their
nonconforming uses and buildings-occasioned by the imposition
of zoning controls for the first time or by zoning changes-have
also been frustrated when they turn to the courts. Local zoning
ordinances commonly feature provisions that prescribe the expan-
79. See, e.g., Robert J. Blackwell, Comment, Overlay Zoning, Performance Standards,
and Environmental Protection after Nollan, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 615, 616 (1989)
(footnotes omitted):
Overlay zones are those that are specifically tailored to protect the environmental
area at issue, whether it be a reservoir, aquifer, forest, or beach area. An out-
growth of Euclidean zoning, overlay zones in effect circumscribe an environmental
area that is already subject to Euclidean regulation, and impose additional re-
quirements thereon. Overlay zones are more effective than other land use controls
in environmental protection because of their flexibility, their concentrated focus
on specific environmental areas, and their use of performance standards.
80. See, e.g., Intermountain W., Inc. v. Boise City, 728 P.2d 767, 769 (Idaho 1986) ("A
zoning ordinance which downgrades the economic value of property does not constitute a
taking of property without compensation at least where some residual value remains in the
property.").
81. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
82. Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Commentary, Euclid Lives: The Survival
of Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158, 2158 (2002).
83. See, e.g., STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 1-6 (5th ed. 2012) ("Since the
late 1930s the Supreme Court has viewed property interests as economic rather than per-
sonal. With the exception of cases in which 'property' has been closely linked to protected
rights, such as free speech and preservation of the family, regulations arguably depriving
landowners of their property rights have been reviewed under the relaxed scrutiny of the
rational basis test").
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sion, enlargement, or alteration of nonconformities,8 4 with the
courts' blessings.85 There is no reason to believe that judges would
be any less accommodating of new restrictions placed on exist-
ing structures and uses in an SLR overlay zone. Similarly, requir-
ing permits for landowner-funded, soft-armoring projects such as
beach nourishment and enhancing floodplain protections would
basically involve intensifying what are already widely accepted
forms of land use control,8 6 thus minimizing the chances that a
court would find a violation of the Takings Clause. Standing in
the way of success for landowners making regulatory takings
arguments in opposition to any of the Table 2B tools discussed to
this point is the Penn Central ad hoc balancing test that courts
employ in partial, as opposed to total, deprivation situations.
While it is theoretically possible for government officials to flunk
the Penn Central balancing test,8 7 the goal of the lawyers in
the front lines of private property rights movement has been to
avoid or even eliminate what they perceive to be a losing legal
paradigm.88 Despite their best efforts, justice and judges seem
comfortable with the dual framework of Penn Central, which seeks
to balance the Holmesian concern over severe diminution in value
attributable to government action8 9 with the Brandeisian caveat
that the state has the power, indeed the obligation, to act in order
to protect overall health, safety, and general welfare. 90 Or, stated
in Armstrongian terms, courts are comfortable with saddling
private owners with some burdens that should not fairly and justly
be carried by the public.
84. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 5.79-5.80 (5th ed. 2003); LAND
USE PLANNING, supra note 78, at 252.
85. See, e.g., Baxter v. City of Preston, 768 P.2d 1340 (Idaho 1989) (reviewing caselaw
from other jurisdictions).
86. See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 32, at §§ 79C.16[2] (on building permits), 79A.02 (on
floodplain regulation).
87. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Hodel v. Irving, 481
U.S. 704 (1987).
88. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 333 n.28 (2002) (noting that the "primary argument" of the Institute for Justice in
its amicus brief is that Penn Central should be overruled: "All partial takings by way of land
use restriction should be subject to the same prima facie rules for compensation as a physi-
cal occupation for a limited period of time").
89. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("One fact for consideration in
determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magni-
tude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensa-
tion to sustain the act.").
90. See id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Every restriction upon the use of proper-
ty imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore
enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the state of rights in property without mak-
ing compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals
from dangers threatened is not a taking.").
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While almost certainly safe under Penn Central, the strategy
of requiring coastal landowners to install a living shoreline-
"utiliz[ing] a variety of structural and organic materials, such
as wetland plants, submerged aquatic vegetation, oyster reefs, coir
fiber logs, sand fill, and stone" as a "more natural bank stabiliza-
tion technique" than "hardened structures, such as bulkheads,
revetment[s], and concrete seawalls"91-- could pose an additional,
though still minimal, takings risk. If government officials estab-
lish such a requirement as a condition for securing permission by a
property owner to initiate or intensify development, Nollan/Dolan
analysis would be triggered. There is a strong likelihood that
the government would prevail, however, (1) given the many legiti-
mate state interests in protecting the fragile coast, interests that
would be furthered either by an outright development ban or
by the installation of a living shoreline as a development condi-
tion, and (2) so long as the requirement to employ the living shore-
line technique bears a roughly proportional relationship to the
impact the development would have on the coastal environment.
The final tool listed in Table 2B--transferable development
rights (TDR)-has a track record dating back several decades, as
a way of protecting not only environmentally sensitive properties
but also historically and architecturally significant structures
and diminishing farm acreage. 92 Because the essence of TDR is
to make the landowner, who is informed that the right to develop
Greenacre (the protected parcel) may be shifted to Blueacre (the
developable parcel), financially whole, the key takings concern
is the "justness" of the compensation, as would be true of any
affirmative use of the power of eminent domain. So long as the
government restores the fair market value of the development
rights lost, the demands of the Takings Clause will be met.
91. Living Shorelines, NOAA HABITAT CONSERVATION RESTORATION CTR., http://www.
habitat.noaa.gov/restoration/techniques/livingshorelines.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
See also Living Shoreline Planning and Implementation, NOAA HABITAT CONSERVATION
RESTORATION CTR., http://www.habitat.noaa.gov/restoration/techniques/lsimplementation.
html (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
92. See, e.g., MANDELKER, supra note 84, at §§ 11.38, 12.16.
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TABLE 2C
SLR ADAPTATION TOOLS
LEVEL 3, MODERATE TAKINGS RISK
* Special assessments for beach nourishment and other soft-
armoring in SLR zones (PT, EX)
* Increased buffers and setbacks for landowners directly affected by
SLR (PT, PO)
* Prohibition of government-financed hard-engineered structures
(armoring) in designated SLR zones (PT)
* Massive public land acquisition in SLR areas and areas nearby fi-
nanced by new taxes and bond issues followed by resale with re-
strictions to private owners (ED)
* Land banking in upland areas for future private use (ED)
KEY:
PO=Physical Occupation (Loretto), ED=Eminent Domain (Kelo),
PT=Partial Taking (Penn Central), EX=Exaction (Dolan)
Some SLR-adaptation strategies pose a more significant,
though still moderate, risk, as shown in Table 2C. No fewer
than four out of the six varieties of takings (all but a Lucas-type
total deprivation and a still-theoretical judicial taking) are appli-
cable to one or more of the tools listed in this table. Nevertheless,
if government regulators take special care to adhere to the letter
and spirit of takings law, they should ultimately avoid negative
court rulings.
The first three strategies-special assessments, increased
buffers and setbacks, and prohibition of potentially harmful struc-
tures-all have regulatory pedigrees stretching back several dec-
ades. Judges have consistently rejected landowner claims that
the out-of-pocket expenditures involved in special assessments
are unfair or unduly burdensome under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses.93 Indeed, near the close of the 2011-2012
Term, the Supreme Court majority in Armour v. City of Indianapo-
lis 94 found a rational basis for the city's adoption of a new assess-
ment and payment plan, despite the fact that landowners who had
already made a lump sum payment under the prior plan did not
receive a refund, while the city forgave any unpaid installments
by other landowners who had opted to make partial payments. 95
93. See, e.g., Fire Dist. No. 1 v. Jenkins, 221 So. 2d 740, 742 (Fla. 1969) ('The basis of
apportionment upon the property subject to special assessment in this case is without un-
just discrimination among those specially assessed, nor are the assessments burdensome
and oppressive in their operation upon the lands affected."); POWELL, supra note 32, at
§ 39.03.
94. 132 S. Ct. 2073 (2012).
95. Id. at 2078-90.
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Property owners faced with initial or expanded setback and
buffer requirements under zoning and other traditional land use
regulations have also been frustrated in mounting legal chal-
lenges. 96 While it is undisputed that the inability to utilize the en-
tire developable area of a parcel quite often reduces the specula-
tive value of that parcel, in the spirit of Euclid and other early
zoning cases, state and federal courts have consistently upheld
reasonable bulk, area, and height restrictions as well within the
state's police power. 97 Given the severe risks posed to coastal re-
gions by SLR, there is every reason to believe that the police
power justification will shield new and additional coastal buffers
and setbacks as well. One caveat is in order at this point, however.
Should government officials seek to couple these setbacks with
permission to the public to use the land unavailable for private
development, this could trigger a physical occupation takings
challenge. There is Supreme Court precedent for the notion that
depriving a private property owner of the "essential" right to ex-
clude others (particularly the public) could trigger a successful
takings challenge. 98
Government regulators may opt to prohibit hard-engineered
structures on- or offshore such as bulkheads, sea walls, groins,
and dikes, 99 as a way of eliminating potential harms to the coastal
environment and to neighboring properties and residents: "Armor-
ing can increase flooding and erosion on neighboring property
and destroy beaches and wetlands that provide natural flood
protections and other ecological services. They also encourage
development in vulnerable areas and can increase risks to people
and property in the event of catastrophic failure."100
Modern building, fire, and electrical codes-creatures of the
police power-contain ample examples of devices and improve-
ments favored by landowners that are prohibited owing to serious
96. See generally MANDELKER, supra note 84, at § 5.71; POWELL, supra note 32, at
§ 79C.05[4][a].
97. See generally MANDELKER, supra note 84, at § 5.74; POWELL, supra note 32, at
§ 79C.05[2].
98. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984) ("With respect to a
trade secret, the right to exclude others is central to the very definition of the property in-
terest. Once the data that constitute a trade secret are disclosed to others, or others are
allowed to use those data, the holder of the trade secret has lost his property interest in the
data."); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (footnote omitted) ("In
this case, we hold that the 'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental ele-
ment of the property right, falls within this category of interests that the Government can-
not take without compensation."). But see Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) ("But
the denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a taking. At least
where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of
the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.").
99. ADAPTATION TOOL KIT, supra note 71, at 36.
100. Id. at 37 (footnote omitted).
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negative externalities. Government-mandated, often-costly, drain-
age and stormwater improvements are ubiquitous in American
cities and suburbs. Landowners who are prohibited from using
one form of protection from SLR would almost certainly be unable
to prove a total deprivation taking, which would mean their coun-
sel would be consigned to the government-friendly partial taking
framework in which judges could easily deem this SLR tool, like
so many others, a "public program adjusting the benefits and bur-
dens of economic life to promote the common good." 10 1
The next two tools possibly, though not necessarily, involve
moderate takings risks of the eminent domain variety. First, gov-
ernment agencies could orchestrate the purchase of undeveloped
coastal properties that are currently in private hands and then
resell those parcels to other private owners subject to severe
restrictions (setbacks, use and development controls, agreements
not to rebuild after coastal storms, and the like). If these poten-
tially massive purchases are funded by new taxes, bond issues,
or other traditional forms of public revenue-raising, they should
be free from takings problems. Should government officials instead
choose to employ the power of eminent domain to achieve the same
goal, changes in some states' constitutional and statutory takings
rules adopted after the Supreme Court's controversial decision
in Kelo v. City of New London 10 2 may pose a problem. After the
furor over Kelo,10 3 many states clarified that it would be inappro-
priate and illegal to use eminent domain solely for economic devel-
opment or revenue-enhancing purposes.'0 4 Therefore, officials in
those states who plan to use eminent domain to effect this strategy
must clarify that the properties are being taken and resold to
further environmental protection purposes, not as a money-making
scheme. Some states have added additional procedural and sub-
stantive hurdles to the taking of land from one private owner
101. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
102. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
103. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 31.
104. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675(3) (West 2012):
No provision in the law of the Commonwealth shall be construed to authorize
the condemnation of private property for transfer to a private owner for the pur-
pose of economic development that benefits the general public only indirectly, such
as by increasing the tax base, tax revenues, or employment, or by promoting the
general economic health of the community.
See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-710.04(1)-(2) (2012):
A condemner may not take property through the use of eminent domain un-
der sections 76-704 to 76-724 if the taking is primarily for an economic develop-
ment purpose .... For purposes of this section, economic development purpose
means taking property for subsequent use by a commercial for-profit enterprise or
to increase tax revenue, tax base, employment, or general economic conditions.
For a chronological review of post-Kelo changes, with details from each state, see POW-
ELL, supra note 32, at § 79F.03[3] [b] [iv].
JOURNAL OF LAND USE
followed by the transfer to another. In Florida, for example, voters
in 2006 approved a constitutional amendment specifying that
"[p]rivate property taken by eminent domain . . . may not be
conveyed to a natural person or private entity except as provided
by general law passed by a three-fifths vote of the membership
of each house of the Legislature."'10 5 This would not be the first
nor the last time that politicians, eager to please constituents who
were stirred up by alarmist accounts of judicial developments,
implemented short-sighted changes that will result in long-range
problems.
As with the purchase and resale of undeveloped coastal prop-
erties, the next strategy-creating a land bank10 6 in upland areas
for future use by private owners displaced by SLR-would require
very large expenditures during a period of fiscal austerity on
the state and local levels. Unfortunately, the depressed real estate
market, greatly influenced by extremely high foreclosure rates,
makes it an opportune time for governments to buy low today
in order to sell high later. If state and local officials can overcome
the admittedly significant financial obstacles, the post-Kelo emi-
nent domain law changes discussed in the previous paragraph
would again pose a moderate threat to this scheme. Indeed, should
those officials choose to take rather than purchase title to the
upland tracts, another feature of the new breed of eminent domain
law would come into effect: a "use it or lose it" requirement that
government use the condemned lands for a public purpose, and
if not offer the properties to the previous owners at the condemna-
tion price. 10 7 Even if government officials can find ways to comply
with the letter of these new takings statutes and constitutional
provisions, the message lawmakers and voters conveyed after Kelo
was strong displeasure with the notion of the state's taking from
Peter and selling to Paul (or Mary). This is reason enough for
public officials to think purchase first and eminent domain only as
a last resort.
105. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(c).
106. For a good working definition suitable for today's economic realities, see FRANK S.
ALEXANDER, CTR. FOR CMTY PROGRESS, LAND BANKS AND LAND BANKING 10 (2011), availa-
ble at http://www.communityprogress.net/filebin/pdf/new-resrcs/LBBook_2011 F.pdf:
Land banks are governmental entities that specialize in the conversion of va-
cant, abandoned and foreclosed properties into productive use. The primary thrust
of all land banks and land banking initiatives is to acquire and maintain proper-
ties that have been rejected by the open market and left as growing liabilities for
neighborhoods and communities. The first task is the acquisition of title to such
properties; the second task is the elimination of the liabilities; the third task is the
transfer of the properties to new owners in a manner most supportive of local
needs and priorities.
107. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. III, § 52j; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-193(c) (2012).
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TABLE 2D
SLR ADAPTATION TOOLS
LEVEL 4, SERIOUS TAKINGS RISK
" Development exactions of conservation easements or of fee title in-
terests, and imposition of coastal impact fees on all permitted de-
velopment in the SLR (EX)
* Prohibition of new, permanent structures in designated SLR zones,
declaring them to be public nuisances (PT, TD)
* Ban on hard- and soft-armoring financed by owners of developed
parcels (PT, TD)
" New judicial decisions that impose rolling easement ambulatory
boundaries and expand public property interests in the coastal zone
(PT, PO, JT)
KEY:
PO=Physical Occupation (Loretto), TD=Total Deprivation (Lucas),
PT=Partial Taking (Penn Central), EX=Exaction (Dolan), JT=Judicial
Taking (STBR)
The four tools listed in Table 2D pose serious takings risks
of one variety or another; therefore, government officials opting
for these strategies should proceed with caution and with the
understanding that they run the risk of violating both the letter
and spirit of the Takings Clause. We can be certain that if gov-
ernment officials make the acquisition of fee title or
other property interests a condition for permitting development,
the Nollan-Dolan requirements will be applicable to this textbook
exactions takings case, while the status of non-real-property exac-
tions (including impact fees) is in a state of flux in the wake of the
Supreme Court's June, 2013, decision in Koontz v. St. Johns River
Water Mgmt. Dist.08 Similarly, should public officials opt for
the second tool in Table 2D-banning any new, permanent struc-
tures in protected coastal zones-we can be pretty sure that affect-
ed landowners will cry "Lucas!," especially since this was the very
tool that the Supreme Court deemed a per se taking. 10 9
There is not the same kind of crystal clear, all-fours precedent
for the third and fourth tools listed in Table 2D: government
prohibitions on the use of private funds by landowners to pro-
vide hard- and soft-armoring and new judicial decisions that rede-
fine and impose new ambulatory boundaries or that expand public
ownership in the coastal zone at the expense of private land-
108. No. 11-1447 (June 25, 2013).
109. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007 (1992) ("In 1988, however,
the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act, which had the
direct effect of barring petitioner from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his
[Lucas's] two parcels.").
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owners. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to anticipate that judges
sympathetic to the plights of affected private owners would be
tempted to invoke one or more takings theories to redress this
perceived public wrong.
V. A ROADMAP FOR DEFENDING THE DEPLOYMENT
OF HIGH-RISK ADAPTATION TOOLS
Before throwing in the towel on the effort to defend the four
tools with takings implications that reach the serious level,
we need to recall that, contrary to the wishes of Richard Epstein
and the private property rights movement he inspired,110 not all
public regulations negatively affecting property values and rights
amount to takings. With apologies to William Thackeray and
others,"11 there is many a slip between the onerous regulation cup
and the unconstitutional takings lip. Table 3 provides a road-
map that governments can follow in their efforts to avoid negative
takings rulings for those tools most at risk. Once again, it is im-
portant to emphasize that the measures recommended here are
offered not as legal technicalities that will provide a safe haven
for bad regulatory behavior, but rather as guideposts designed
to achieve the delicate balance between private rights and public
protection that is embodied in the Armstrong principle.
110. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). See also Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Pro-
ject: A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
509, 526 (1998) ("Epstein's call has also inspired the constitutional litigation strategy of the
current property rights movement, which increasingly has turned its attention to the feder-
al judiciary as the means by which it will accomplish its agenda."). For challenges to the
historical underpinnings of Professor Epstein's more recent scholarship, see William Mi-
chael Treanor, Supreme Neglect of Text and History, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1059 (2009) (review-
ing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: HOW TO REVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY (2008)); Michael Allan Wolf, Looking Backward: Richard Epstein
Ponders the "Progressive" Peril, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1233 (2007) (reviewing RICHARD A. EP-
STEIN, How PROGESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION (2006)).
111. See, e.g., WILLIAM MAKEPEACE THACKERAY, II THE HISTORY OF PENDENNIS 745
(1858) (" 'There's many a slip between the cup and the lip! Who knows what may happen.' ").
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TABLE 3
SLR ADAPTATION TOOLS
ADDRESSING SERIOUS TAKINGS RISKS
" Development exactions of conservation easements or of fee title in-
terests, and imposition of coastal impact fees on all permitted de-
velopment in the SLR (EX)
Articulating essential nexus + rough proportionality
" Prohibition of new, permanent structures in designated SLR zones,
declaring them to be public nuisances (PT, TD)
Identifying allowable uses or identifying background princi-
ples attributes of new regulation
* Ban on hard- and soft-armoring financed by owners of developed
parcels (PT, TD)
Clarifying that the Fifth Amendment applies to government
takings not to takings by the forces of nature; identifying al-
lowable uses or establishing background principles attrib-
utes of new regulation
* New judicial decisions that impose rolling easement ambulatory
boundaries or that expand public property interests in the coastal
zone (PT,PO, JT)
Marshaling relevant precedent(s)
KEY:
PO=Physical Occupation (Loretto), TD=Total Deprivation (Lucas),
PT=Partial Taking (Penn Central), EX=Exaction (Dolan),
JT=Judicial Taking (STBR)
States and local governments have long possessed the power
to place limits on development, in the coastal zone or any other
location. When property owners seek to avoid those limits by, for
example, securing a zoning amendment or variance, public officials
can respond with a "yes," a "no," or a "yes, but" (otherwise known
as conditional permitting). Government officials who exact from
private landowners seeking development permission the donation
of conservation easements either to the public or to a land trust
need to be prepared to pass the Nollan (essential nexus) and Dolan
(rough proportionality) tests. To satisfy the first, they will merely
have to demonstrate that the purpose of the exaction condition
(such as the protection of the fragile and shifting coastal envi-
ronment) matches what would be the justification for an outright
prohibition of the proposed development. To meet the second,
slightly more demanding, test, they will have to show that the
nature and extent of the real property interest being exacted is
roughly proportional to the impact that the proposed develop-
ment would have on the coastal environment. Conservation ease-
ments that place limits on developable area, height, nature and
intensity of use, non-permeable surfaces created, proximity to
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the mean high water mark or shoreline vegetation, and the like
are much less problematic than the public access easements
that troubled the Court in Dolan. Still, government regulators
must be careful to calibrate each individual exaction so that a
skeptical judge does not conclude that the public would reap an
undeserved windfall at the landowner's expense.
Before the Koontz decision, the imposition of coastal impact
fees for all permitted development located in the SLR would have
been situated comfortably at the moderate risk level. However, if
state and lower federal courts ambitiously apply the Supreme
Court's ruling such fees could prove problematic for coastal regula-
tors.
States and localities throughout the nation have for decades
imposed impact fees on developers of residential and commercial
property in order to offset the costs of additional and enhanced
public amenities such as roads, schools, water and sewer systems,
and recreational facilities attributable to new development. 112 Sev-
eral courts have refused to wield the Takings Clause in order to
invalidate these programs, despite what can be significant impacts
on property owners and developers.113
Although the Supreme Court had indicated in repeated dicta
that the Nollan-Dolan tests would apply only to exactions of real
property interests such as fees or easements rather than money or
other forms of personal property, 11 4 and while several (though not
all) state and lower federal courts ruled in a similar fashion when
considering the question directly, 115 the Koontz Court shifted
112. See, e.g., MANDELKER, supra note 84, at §§ 9.20-9.22; POWELL, supra note 32, at
§ 79D.04[4].
113. See, e.g., St. Clair Cnty. Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Pell City, 61 So. 3d 992
(Ala. 2010); Home Builders Ass'n of Dayton v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349 (Ohio
2000); McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995).
114. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005) ("Nollan and Dolan
both involved dedications of property so onerous that, outside the exactions context, they
would be deemed per se physical takings."); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monte-
rey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999) ("[W]e have not extended the rough-proportionality test
of Dolan beyond the special context of exactions-land-use decisions conditioning approval
of development on the dedication of property to public use.").
115. See, e.g., St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1229-30
(Fla. 2011), rev'd, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 4918):
One line of cases holds that the Nollan/Dolan standard applies solely to ex-
actions cases involving land-use dedications. See, e.g., McClung v. City of Sumner,
548 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing monetary conditions from con-
ditions on the land); Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1578 (10th Cir.
1995); Sea Cabins on the Ocean IV Homeowners Ass'n v. City of N. Myrtle Beach,
345 S.C. 418, 548 S.E.2d 595, 603 n.5 (2001) (holding that Del Monte Dunes clari-
fied that Nollan and Dolan only apply to physical conditions imposed upon land).
The other line of cases holds that the Nollan/Dolan test extends beyond the
context of the imposition of real property conditions on real property. For example,
the California Supreme Court has held that non-real property conditions can con-
stitute a taking where the condition is imposed on a discretionary, individualized
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course. Writing for a five-member majority, Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy explained that "so-called 'monetary exactions' must satisfy
the nexus and rough proportionality requirements of Nollan and
Dolan,"116 thereby overruling the Supreme Court of Florida, which
had concluded that the "doctrine of exactions" does not apply "to an
alleged exaction that does not involve the dedication of an interest
in or over real property" and to a situation in which "an exaction
does not occur and no permit is issued by the regulatory entity."117
The ultimate impact of Koontz on impact fees and exactions of
money will depend on the willingness of government regulators to
risk judicial challenges by continuing to employ these tools and on
the outcomes of subsequent judicial decisions. Even though state
and local government officials can find some solace in Justice Ken-
nedy's assurance that the Court's ruling "does not affect the ability
of governments to impose property taxes, user fees, and similar
laws and regulations that may impose financial burdens on prop-
erty owners," 118 not all fees will receive the same judicial indul-
gence:
Because the government need only provide a permit appli-
cant with one alternative that satisfies the nexus and rough
proportionality standards, a permitting authority wishing
to exact an easement could simply give the owner a choice
of either surrendering an easement or making a payment
equal to the easement's value. Such so-called "in lieu of'
fees are utterly commonplace, and they are functionally
equivalent to other types of land use exactions. 119
Justice Elena Kagan, writing for the four dissenters, painted an
even bleaker picture:
The majority turns a broad array of local land-use regula-
tions into federal constitutional questions. It deprives state
and local governments of the flexibility they need to en-
hance their communities-to ensure environmentally sound
basis. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 12 Cal. 4th 854, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242, 911
P.2d 429, 444 (1996). However, in Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd.
Partnership, 135 S.W.3d 620, 640-41 (Tex. 2004), the Texas Supreme Court ex-
panded application of the test further, holding that Nollan and Dolan can apply to
certain non-real property conditions that arise from generally applicable regula-
tions.
116. Koontz, No. 11-1447, slip op. at 15.
117. Koontz, 77 So. 3d, at 1222.
118. Koontz, No. 11-1447, slip op. at 18.
119. Id. at 15 (citing Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land
Use Regulation: Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 202-203 (2006)).
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and economically productive development. It places courts
smack in the middle of the most everyday local government
activity. 1 20
Until we have more judicial gloss on the Koontz ruling, govern-
ment officials who choose to exact coastal impact fees should play
it safe and make sure that they can satisfy the Nollan essential
nexus and the Dolan rough proportionality requirements. 121
Even a total prohibition of permanent structures could survive
judicial scrutiny, despite the result in Lucas after remand to the
state court. 122 First, drawing inspiration from the justices not
part of the Lucas majority who expressed doubts concerning the
finding that a total deprivation had in fact occurred,1 23 govern-
ment counsel could demonstrate that more than token value re-
mained on the targeted parcels even after the challenged reg-
ulation went into place. Much like what happened in the First
English case on remand, in which the California Court of Appeal
found that the floodplain ordinance did not deprive the owner of
120. Id. at 18 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
121. The Koontz Court also ruled that "[tihe principles that undergird our decisions in
Nollan and Dolan do not change depending on whether the government approves a permit
on the condition that the applicant turn over property or denies a permit because the appli-
cant refuses to do so." Id. at 8. See also Mark Fenster, Failed Exactions, 36 VT. L. REV. 623,
644 (2012) (footnotes omitted):
Wary government agencies might simply deny permits and face lower scrutiny
under the Penn Central test rather than discuss mitigation measures as condi-
tions for approval and face heightened scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan. By inhib-
iting a government agency's willingness to bargain without inhibiting its authority
to deny a property owner's application to develop, applying Nollan and Dolan to
failed exactions would eliminate a valuable right from property owners-or at
least an important opportunity to reach a preferred end-while simultaneously
removing a key regulatory tool and process for government agencies. This repre-
sents the worst possible result: government agencies cannot negotiate adequate,
workable mitigation measures with property owners; property owners are more
likely to be denied discretionary approvals from wary government agencies; and
the entire regulatory process becomes more rigid and mechanical, resulting in a
larger proportion of denials and fewer negotiated solutions to pressing environ-
mental and planning conflicts.
122. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992) ("Coastal Coun-
cil has not persuaded us that any common law basis exists by which it could restrain Lu-
cas's desired use of his land; nor has our research uncovered any such common law princi-
ple.").
123. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1043-44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) ("The
Court creates its new takings jurisprudence based on the trial court's finding that the prop-
erty had lost all economic value. This finding is almost certainly erroneous."); id. at 1062
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[O]n the present record it is entirely possible that petitioner has
suffered no injury in fact even if the state statute was unconstitutional when he filed this
lawsuit."); id. at 1076 (statement of Souter, J.) (citations omitted) ("The petition for review
was granted on the assumption that the State by regulation had deprived the owner of his
entire economic interest in the subject property .... It is apparent now that in light of our
prior cases, the trial court's conclusion is highly questionable.").
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all use (as was alleged in its complaint), 124 government counsel
faced with a total deprivation claim need to take the time and
effort to explain that valuable uses remain after building prohi-
bitions are put in place in an SLR zone. Once facts are marshaled
that demonstrate that a partial taking has occurred, the govern-
ing precedent will shift to the much more public-sector-friendly
Penn Central.
Should government counsel be unable to find any meaning-
ful use or value once the prohibition goes into effect, there is still
a chance, though quite slight, that the total deprivation claim
will fail. The government will have to demonstrate to the satisfac-
tion of the court that, under background principles of state public
nuisance law, the construction of permanent structures in a frag-
ile and ever-shifting shoreline (such as a barrier island that has
been devastated repeatedly by tropical storms and hurricanes)
would pose serious harms to the public at large (and not just to
one or two neighboring properties). The fact that the framers of
the Constitution and the Fifth Amendment were unaware of envi-
ronmental hazards such as fecal coliforms or may have lived in
a pre-SLR era will not prove fatal to the government's case, for,
as Justice Scalia conceded in the Lucas opinion itself, "The fact
that a particular use has long been engaged in by similarly situat-
ed owners ordinarily imports a lack of any common-law prohibit-
tion (though changed circumstances or new knowledge may make
what was previously permissible no longer soD]. 125 Neverthe-
less, winning this argument will be difficult, as it should be if the
landowner's use and value are truly reduced to zero or to a very
negligible amount.
The takings analysis for the next tool-prohibiting landown-
ers from paying for and using hard- and soft-armoring in order to
salvage dry, developable land-might at first glance appear to
124. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 258 Cal. Rptr.
893, 902 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989):
True, the complaint alleges interim ordinance No. 11,855 denies First English
"all use" of Lutherglen. But as will be seen shortly, the ordinance does not deny
First English "all use" of this property. It does not even prevent occupancy and use
of any structures which may have survived the flood. It only prohibits the recon-
struction of structures which were demolished or damaged by the raging waters
and the construction of new structures. In no sense does it prohibit uses of this
campground property which can be carried out without the reconstruction of de-
molished buildings or the erection of new ones. First English's complaint stated
solely a facial challenge to the interim ordinance and as far as this ordinance itself
was concerned, many camping activities could continue on this property. Meals
could be cooked, games played, lessons given, tents pitched.
125. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031 (emphasis added). Background principles are not limited
to public or private nuisance, of course. Some courts have placed public trust in that catego-
ry. See, e.g., Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2002);
McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 2003).
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be identical to that used for partial (Penn Central) or total (Lucas)
deprivations occasioned by the prohibition of permanent struc-
tures. There are, however, three key differences. First, a property
owner who can demonstrate that without bulkheads, seawalls,
revetments, dikes, beach nourishment or other means his or her
land will be lost, and that he or she is prepared to pick up what
could be a very substantial bill to prevent that (perhaps) total loss,
will still have to demonstrate that government is the cause of
the Fifth Amendment taking. It is important to recall that the
Armstrong principle speaks about "[g]overnment," not rising seas
or coastal storms, "forcing some people to bear public burdens."1 26
Even Justice Scalia and his colleagues in the Stop the Beach
Renourishment plurality, who highlighted the passive voice used in
the Takings Clause,1 27 speak of "the branch of government effecting
the expropriation."' 128
The second difference is that landowners in this situation,
unlike with a Lucas-like building prohibition, would be resting
their cases on the violation of some kind of "fundamental right
to maintain structures despite the effects of the forces of nature,"
which is a stick not found in any of the familiar bundles of prop-
erty rights.129 Indeed, the existence of government restrictions
on rebuilding after structures are significantly damaged by natu-
ral hazards such as coastal flooding and extremely high winds, 130
common-law rules for attaching liability for diffused surface
water, 131 and state and local requirements concerning the composi-
tion of building and foundational materials indicate strongly that
placing even significant burdens on any such proffered right would
126. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (emphasis added).
127. STBR v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601 (2010).
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. For a copious compendium of the rights contained in the mythical bundle, see
Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstruction of Property: Property as a Web of Interests,
26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 285 n.20 (2002):
See [JESSE DUKEMENIER & JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY (3d ed. 1993)], at 86 (the
rights to possess, use, exclude, and transfer); [EDWARD H. RABIN ET AL., FUNDA-
MENTALS OF MODERN PROPERTY LAW (4th ed. 2000)], at 1 (the rights to exclude,
possess or occupy, dispose of or alienate, manage, and receive income); [JOHN G.
SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW (2000)], at 5-6 (the rights to ex-
clude, transfer, possess, and use); Richard A. Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 2, 3 (1990) (the rights to possess, use, and dispose of); A.
M. Honor6, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS ON JURISPRUDENCE 107, 113-24 (A. G.
Guest ed., 1961) (the rights to possess, use, manage, receive income and capital,
and maintain security; the incidents of transmissibility and absence of term; the
prohibition of harmful use; and the liability to execution); Roscoe Pound, The Law
of Property and Recent Juristic Thought, 25 ABA J. 993, 997 (1939) (the rights to
possess, exclude, dispose of, use, enjoy the fruits and profits, and destroy or in-
jure).
130. See, e.g., Palazzola v. City of Gulfport, 52 So. 2d 611 (Miss. 1951). See also MAN-
DELKER, supra note 84, at § 5.80.
131. See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 32, at § 65.12[2].
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be much less likely to result in a favorable takings ruling than
cases involving the much more recognizable and respected (though
certainly not absolute) rights to exclude and alienate.
The third way in which a takings challenge to the prohibition
of armoring to protect existing structures is weaker than a ban
on new, permanent structures is that, even if the court should
somehow find that that the government is the cause of a total
deprivation, the public and private nuisance exceptions claims will
be easier for government counsel to mount. The negative environ-
mental externalities attributable to seawalls, bulkheads, revet-
ments, dikes, and the like are serious and diverse, not just to
adjoining properties but to the coastal ecology as a whole. These
serious impacts include exacerbated erosion, prevention of land-
ward migration of wetlands, prevention of submerged aquatic
vegetation, and trapped marine life.13 2 Beach nourishment, too, is
far from benign, despite its obvious aesthetic benefits:
Beach nourishment affects the environment of both the
beach being filled and the nearby seafloor "borrow areas"
that are dredged to provide the sand. Adding large quanti-
ties of sand to a beach is potentially disruptive to turtles
and birds that nest on dunes and to the burrowing species
that inhabit the beach, though less disruptive in the long
term than replacing the beach and dunes with a hard struc-
ture. The impact on the borrow areas is a greater concern:
the highest quality sand for nourishment is often contained
in a variety of shoals which are essential habitat for shell-
fish and related organisms .... As technology improves to
recover smaller, thinner deposits of sand offshore, a greater
area of ocean floor must be disrupted to provide a given
volume of sand. Moreover, as sea level rises, the required
volume is likely to increase, further expanding the disrup-
tion to the ocean floor.133
Armed with these facts, government counsel should be prepared
to identify and defend the nuisance-preventing attributes of reg-
ulations banning armoring to protect one or a few improved coastal
parcels.
The final tool in Table 2D is a state court decision that imposes
ambulatory boundaries on parcels in coastal regions that have
been ravaged by increasingly violent storms and subject to the
132. See, e.g., JAMES G. TITUS ET AL., U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, COASTAL
SENSITIVITY TO SEA-LEVEL RISE: A FOCUS ON THE MID-ATLANTIC REGION 99 (2009).
133. Id. at 98, 100 (citations omitted).
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erosive effects of rising seas. While "rolling easement" is fast
becoming an essential term in the SLR-adaptation lexicon, it is
important to note that the phrase, according to one authoritative
source, encompasses
a broad collection of legal options, many of which do not in-
volve easements. Usually, a rolling easement is either (a) a
regulation that prohibits shore protection or (b) a property
right to ensure that wetlands, beaches, barrier islands, or
access along the shore moves [sic] inland with the natural
retreat of the shore. Although the regulatory approach is
the more common way to prevent shore protection, the non-
regulatory approach may sometimes work better. Private
land trusts, government agencies, and (for some approach-
es) even private citizens can buy (or secure donations of)
rolling easements from property owners. 134
On the one hand, the voluntary donation of fee title or servi-
tudes such as easements by private owners to public agencies
or land trusts involves no takings risks at all. On the other hand,
exactions of these types of property interests by government offi-
cials in exchange for development permission would involve a seri-
ous takings risk, as discussed previously. 13 5
The most problematic form of rolling easement, at least from
the takings perspective, would be a judicial decision recognizing
or establishing ambulatory boundaries at the expense of private
coastal landowners, not just by the traditional, gradual process
known as erosion, 136 but, more controversially, in circumstances
involving sudden, avulsive events such as tropical storms and
hurricanes. 137 Should a state high court allow a public beachfront
134. TITUS, supra note 72, at 6. See also id. at 5-6:
[Al rolling easement is a legally enforceable expectation that the shore or human
access along the shore can migrate inland instead of being squeezed between an
advancing sea and a fixed property line or physical structure. The "rolling ease-
ment holder" could be the government agency whose regulations prohibit shore
protection, or the person, land trust, or government agency who obtains the prop-
erty rights embodied in a rolling easement.
135. See supra notes 114-121 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 33, at § 66.01 ('The term 'erosion' denotes the pro-
cess by which land is gradually covered by water.").
137. See, e.g., STBR v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2598-99 (2010) (em-
phasis added) (citations omitted):
When .. .there is a "sudden or perceptible loss of or addition to land by the
action of the water or a sudden change in the bed of a lake or the course of a
stream," the change is called an avulsion.
In Florida, as at common law, the littoral owner automatically takes title to
dry land added to his property by accretion; but formerly submerged land that has
become dry land by avulsion continues to belong to the owner of the seabed (usual-
ly the State). Thus, regardless of whether an avulsive event exposes land previ-
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easement to "roll" landward, in some cases even beyond the loca-
tion of private buildings and other improvements, the private
landowner would almost certainly bring a takings challenge based
on the public's physical occupation of the land.138 Even a partial
takings claim would seem promising, in light of the fact that
the public would gain access to the parcel. 139 However, the contro-
versial concept that judicial branch activity is covered by the Tak-
ings Clause is still one vote shy of a Supreme Court majority.
Should that fifth vote materialize in a future high court case, there
are strategies that government counsel could pursue that might
bring success.
Initially, it is important to focus carefully on Justice Scalia's
formulation for the Stop the Beach Renourishment plurality: "If
a legislature or a court declares that what was once an established
right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that prop-
erty, no less than if the State had physically appropriated it or
destroyed its value by regulation." 140 The plaintiff would have the
heavy burden of demonstrating that all three elements were
present: (1) an established property right, (2) the elimination of
ously submerged or submerges land previously exposed, the boundary between lit-
toral property and sovereign land does not change; it remains (ordinarily) what
was the mean high-water line before the event.
138. See, e.g., Severance v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 490, 492-93 (5th Cir. 2009), certified
questions answered in 370 S.W.3d 705 (Tex. 2012):
Severance contends that because the beach boundary of her property migrat-
ed landward after Hurricane Rita, taking in land not previously encumbered by a
public access easement, the enforcement of the easement on her beachfront prop-
erties constitutes a seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment and a taking
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The district court
dismissed the action, ruling that Severance failed to state a claim for relief be-
cause Texas law recognizes a "rolling" beachfront easement; this type of easement
predated Severance's purchase of her beachfront properties; the State may enforce
the easement as natural changes occur in its location; and no constitutional viola-
tion results from an uncompensated change in the easement's location on Sever-
ance's property.
The Supreme Court of Texas provided this clarification of state law in support of private
landowners' claims:
We hold that Texas does not recognize a "rolling" easement. Easements for
public use of private dry beach property change size and shape along with the
gradual and imperceptible erosion or accretion in the coastal landscape. But, avul-
sive events such as storms and hurricanes that drastically alter pre-existing litto-
ral boundaries do not have the effect of allowing a public use easement to migrate
onto previously unencumbered property. This holding shall not be applied to use
the avulsion doctrine to upset the long-standing boundary between public and pri-
vate ownership at the mean high tide line. The division between public and pri-
vate ownership remains at the mean high tide line in the wake of naturally occur-
ring changes, and even when boundaries seem to change suddenly.
Severance, 370 U.S. at 724-25 (footnote omitted).
139. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) ("A 'tak-
ing' may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as
a physical invasion by government .....
140. STBR, 130 S. Ct. at 2602.
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that right by a court, and (3) the equivalence of that elimination
with physical appropriation or destruction of value.
Regarding the first two elements, the plurality opinion con-
ceded that a judicial "decision that clarifies property entitlements
(or the lack thereof) that were previously unclear might be difficult
to predict, but it does not eliminate established property rights."141
Therefore, if the state of the law concerning littoral rights, public
trust, accretion, reliction, erosion, avulsion, public access ease-
ments, and related matters should be in any substantial way
unsettled, as it frequently is in coastal states, 142 the court would be
clarifying, not taking. Government counsel should therefore mar-
shal relevant precedents to demonstrate that the law, much like
the coastal ecology itself, is in flux.
The existence of state precedent is what proved fatal to the
plaintiff landowners' claims in Stop the Beach Renourishment
itself, for as Justice Scalia noted in the opinion for the Court:
Under petitioner's theory, because no prior Florida decision
had said that the State's filling of submerged tidal lands
could have the effect of depriving a littoral owner of contact
with the water and denying him future accretions, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court's judgment in the present case abolished
those two easements to which littoral property owners had
been entitled. This puts the burden on the wrong party.
141, Id. at 2610 (emphasis added).
142. See, e.g., Feinman v. State, 717 S.W.2d 106, 111 (Tex. App.1986) ("[W]e conclude
that the vegetation line is not stationary and that a rolling easement is implicit in the [Tex-
as Open Beaches] Act."), criticized in Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 728 n.23 (citation omitted)
("Feinman does not consider the legal implications of the difference between avulsive and
gradual changes to the coast, concluding the distinction to be immaterial to its decision
because it apparently viewed the distinction not relevant to the question of an easement,
only title to property. We disagree with the latter conclusion.").
See also Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property: The Ac-
commodation Principle, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 649, 665 (2010) ('CThe frontiers of the public
trust doctrine no doubt lie in such upland resources with great public value. This amphibi-
ous evolution is only a continuation of the doctrine's historical advance from tidal to inland
navigable waters."); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Proper-
ty Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 802 (2009) (footnotes omitted):
Historically, public access to beaches was quite limited. Basically, the public
was permitted to access only the land between the mean high and low tide lines,
i.e., wet-sand areas. The purposes for which the public was permitted to access
this land were also limited-only fishing. In recent years some courts have added
recreation as one of the purposes for which the public is entitled to use the wet-
sand portion of a beach. The more striking expansion of beach access via the pub-
lic trust doctrine, custom, and other doctrinal headings, however, has been the ex-
tension to privately-owned dry-sand portions of the beach. The New Jersey Su-
preme Court has taken the lead in this expansion of public beach access via the
public trust doctrine. In Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, [471 A.2d 355
(N.J. 1984),] the court held a private nonprofit entity which owned or leased most
of the beachfront lots in Bay Head did not have an unlimited right to exclude
members of the public from the dry-sand portion of its beach.
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There is no taking unless petitioner can show that, before
the Florida Supreme Court's decision, littoral-property
owners had rights to future accretions and contact with the
water superior to the State's right to fill in its submerged
land. Though some may think the question close, in our
view the showing cannot be made. 143
Moreover, the eight participating justices did not feel bound to rely
only on those precedents cited by the Supreme Court of Florida
when they dismissed the petitioner's claims. The state high court
decision
did not abolish the Members' right to future accretions, but
merely held that the right was not implicated by the beach-
restoration project, because the doctrine of avulsion applied.
The Florida Supreme Court's opinion describes beach resto-
ration as the reclamation by the State of the public's land,
just as Martin [v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927)]
had described the lake drainage in that case. Although the
opinion does not cite Martin and is not always clear on this
point, it suffices that its characterization of the littoral
right to accretion is consistent with Martin and the other
relevant principles of Florida law we have discussed. 144
The confusing state of the common law provides an important
advantage for attorneys fending off a judicial takings claim.
In the unlikely event that the state high court has acted
contrary to established precedent in a blatant attempt to make
public what was once clearly private, the plaintiff would still need
to prove the third element-that the court's decision occasioned
the functional equivalence of a physical appropriation or total
deprivation taking. Yet, the facts on the ground (or, rather, under
the water) belie the assertion that the government, and not the
forces of nature, is the primary or major cause of any physical
appropriation in a rolling-easement avulsion situation. In addition,
unless the Court should employ conceptual severance to segre-
gate the public access easement from the parcel as a whole, 145
143. STBR, 130 S. Ct., at 2610-11.
144. Id. at 2612 (citation omitted).
145. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 331 (2002) (citation omitted):
Petitioners seek to bring this case under the rule announced in Lucas by arguing
that we can effectively sever a 32-month segment from the remainder of each
landowner's fee simple estate, and then ask whether that segment has been taken
in its entirety by the moratoria. Of course, defining the property interest taken in
terms of the very regulation being challenged is circular. With property so divided,
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which would itself be a departure from precedent, 146 the odds of
a total deprivation, as noted previously, 147 would run in the highly
unpromising slim-to-none range.
VI. ARMSTRONGING, NOT LEGAL STRONG-ARMING
There are good reasons why the Takings Clause should not
determine the validity of rolling easements specifically and SLR
adaptation generally. Returning to the text and sentiments of
Armstrong, we are instructed that the Clause's dozen words were
"designed to bar Government from forcing" the few to bear "public
burdens."148 They are not a surefire warranty of landowner protec-
tion against all hazards. Neither should they serve as a threat
to responsible citizens and their public servants who, relying on
the best science available, are finally taking steps to adjust to the
new reality of mega-storms, melting glaciers, increased greenhouse
gas emissions, and warming oceans.
As many of the victims of Hurricane Sandy have recently
learned, along with the aesthetic, recreational, and economic bene-
fits of living close to the sea come heightened risks of destruction
to persons and property. For those who are un- or underinsured,
or for those for whom government assistance proves inadequate,
there are no convenient defendants with deep pockets who are
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts. Polar ice caps are not sub-
ject to service of process; lawsuits blaming companies that produce
and consume coal and other fossil fuels for the damages wrought
by powerful storms could not survive summary judgment. How
regrettable it would be if, looking back a decade or two from now,
the legal landscape were littered with takings lawsuits threatened
and brought against state and local governments who chose to
act while politicians continued to engage in demagoguery, and the
waters continued to rise.
every delay would become a total ban; the moratorium and the normal permit pro-
cess alike would constitute categorical takings. Petitioners' "conceptual severance"
argument is unavailing because it ignores Penn Central's admonition that in regu-
latory takings cases we must focus on "the parcel as a whole." We have consistent-
ly rejected such an approach to the "denominator" question.
The term "conceptual severance" derives from Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception
of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1674-
80 (1988).
146. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978) ("In
deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses
rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference
with rights in the parcel as a whole-here, the city tax block designated as the 'landmark
site.' "). For subsequent Court cases invoking this language, see Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987); Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 327.
147. See supra notes 123-124 and accompanying notes.
148. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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